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A Note on Natural Gas Market Evolution In Light of Transactions Cost Theory 
Summary 
A liquid spot market does not exist in the international natural gas market for two reasons according to 
transaction cost theory: small numbers of traders and the need for large relationship-specific 
investments.  Spot markets with small numbers of buyers or sellers can lead to situations with costly and 
continual bargaining, raising transactions costs.  Relationship-specific investments are those specific to a 
trading relationship that have greater value inside the relationship then outside.   
The hold-up problem emerges when opportunistic trading partners, who either did not make a 
relationship-specific investment or made a relatively inexpensive one, take advantage of the situation by 
changing the prices they are willing to pay or charge.  In both cases contracts are an efficient alternative 
to spot markets because they can reduce transactions costs and mitigate the hold-up problem from 
relationship-specific investments.1  Vertical integration is an alternative to a contract, but access issues 
and inefficiencies arising from such integration can make contracts more appealing. 
This underlying theory suggests there are three factors which will have an important influence on the 
evolution of the natural gas market.  The first is the size of relationship-specific investments.  Theory 
suggests that as the value of these investments falls, so does the duration of contracts.  These may fall 
due to a mature industry where most infrastructure has been built, or the emergence of liquid spot 
markets.  A falling size of relationship-specific investments may also increase the number of buyers 
(wholesalers, traders, etc.) and sellers (LNG exporters) in the natural gas market. 
The number of buyers and sellers in different natural gas markets is also important.  More buyers and 
sellers can reduce the size of relationship-specific investments because the risk of finding a buyer or 
seller in the future is reduced.  This can also lead to lower transactions costs because of less bargaining.  
Both of these can shorten contract durations.  Increased numbers of buyers and sellers may also lead to 
a more competitive market, reducing the chances for either a buyer or seller to use their market power 
or engage in collusive behavior. 
The regulatory regime is a third factor influencing the evolution of natural gas markets.  Any type of 
regulation which distorts the incentives of buyers of sellers will shorten the duration of contracts in the 
natural gas industry according to transaction cost theory.  This is because such regulation raises the 
costs of monitoring a contract, and these additional costs reduce the benefits of extending a contract.  
Well-structured regulations, however, are instrumental in avoiding situations where market power can 
be exerted, such as in the case of pipeline access. 
 
 
                                                          
1 In the agency-based approach, contracts can exist as a risk transfer mechanism between parties to a transaction.  
Such a contract is way for either party, who may have large fixed costs and small variable costs, to guarantee a 
return on investment by transferring some risk to the other party. 
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Why Do Contracts Exist in the Natural Gas Industry? 
Agency theory and transaction cost economics are the two primary approaches to explaining the 
existence of contracts.2  In an agency framework, contracts help to overcome difficulties which a 
principal has when hiring an agent.  Because the principal may have divergent goals from the agent, and 
it is costly to monitor the agent (maybe impossible), actions going against the interests of the principal 
may be taken by the agent.  Even if the principal is able to monitor the agent, the principal and agent 
may prefer different actions because they differ in their tolerance of risk (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
In this situation a contract can emerge to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal.  
Such an agreement might make it less costly to monitor or verify the actions of the agent, and a contract 
can also transfer risk between the principal and the agent.  This risk-transfer function of contracts is the 
part of agency theory most relevant to the natural gas industry.  Due to large investment costs and 
uncertainty over future prices and production, there is substantial risk in agreeing to purchase or 
produce natural gas.  According to agency theory a contract can help to transfer some of this risk.  This is 
also true when spot markets exist but are not liquid, as has been historically true in natural gas.3  Firms 
may enter into a contract if they have large fixed costs and small variable costs, as is often the case in 
natural gas, because the contract can transfer some of this risk to the other party. 
The agency view of the natural gas industry is unsatisfactory because it cannot explain why spot markets 
are unable to provide this risk transfer, or how to differentiate between the principal and agent in the 
buyer-seller relationship.  The transaction cost economics approach seems more applicable to the 
natural gas industry.  To understand this theory, it is easiest to begin with spot markets, identify their 
weaknesses, and then explain how contracts can emerge due to these weaknesses. 
Fully developed spot markets are able to determine prices based on the interactions of supply and 
demand.  If there are many buyers and sellers so that these markets are competitive, using spot markets 
allows for adaptability under changing conditions, cost minimization, and the realization of economies 
of scale.  Because spot markets are continually changing, variations in supply and demand will adjust 
prices and quantities traded instantaneously, allowing for adaptation.  Competitive spot markets also 
lead to cost minimization by suppliers because they gain any benefits from reducing costs.  Economies of 
scale result in competitive markets because even buyers with a small demand for a good are able to 
purchase at the minimum of average costs when there are many suppliers all producing at this level 
(Church and Ware, 2000, Ch. 3).  In addition, if there is security of supply, then a competitive futures 
market might exist which would allow traders to hedge against risk if there is price volatility. 
If spot markets work well, why have contracts been prevalent in the natural gas industry?  The 
advantages of using spot markets depend on the ability of either the buyer or seller (or both) to change 
                                                          
2 Hart and Holmstrom (1987) provide a survey of agency theory and Tadelis and Williamson (Forthcoming) do the 
same for transaction cost economics.  A comparison of how the two theories fit the data is Masten and Saussier 
(2000). 
3 Spot markets with small numbers of buyers or sellers may increase the risk of either buying or selling because 
there is no guarantee that a buyer or seller will be available in the future.   Contracts can be used to hedge such 
price or quantity risk. 
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trading partners relatively inexpensively.  Historically, this has been difficult in the natural gas industry 
because of the small numbers of buyers and sellers and large investment costs.  Spot markets with small 
numbers of buyers or sellers can lead to situations with costly and continual bargaining, raising 
transactions costs.  Contracts are one way to avoid these costs (Church and Ware, 2000, Ch. 3). 
Another reason that contracts may exist is that buyers and sellers may make investments specific to the 
trading relationship that have greater value inside the relationship then outside.  Examples of these 
include pipelines, pipeline extensions, or LNG re-gasification facilities.  These relationship-specific 
investments can make it very costly to find a new trading partner.  It is then possible for an opportunistic 
trading partner, who either did not make the relationship-specific investment or made a relatively 
inexpensive one, to take advantage of the situation by changing the prices they are willing to pay or 
charge.  This is known as the hold-up problem (Tadelis and Williamson, Forthcoming).  Contracts are one 
way to get around the hold-up problem, as they provide a mechanism for parties to commit to their 
future behavior (Lafontaine and Slade, Forthcoming). 
 
Why Contracts and Not Vertical Integration? 
The importance of hold-up problems can disappear with vertical integration.  Either the buyer or seller 
could purchase their counterparty, thereby eliminating the relationship-specific investment and any 
potential for hold-up.  Vertically integrating in this way by eliminating the use of contracts can allow the 
newly expanded firm to replicate the efficient adaptation of a liquid spot market.  However, there are 
several reasons why such vertical integration may be problematic. 
The main reason, which is not related to theoretical issues, is because of access.  Either the buyer or 
seller may simply be unable to get the rights to purchase their counterparty.  Aside from this, it may also 
be that the costs of vertical integration outweigh its benefits.  One potentially large cost is the increasing 
level of inefficiency which can accompany greater size.  Such inefficiency may occur because the newly 
integrated unit no longer produces as efficiently.  Before the firm had to sell its product at a (market) 
price, but this incentive for cost minimization may no longer be as strong as a division of a larger firm.  It 
might also be the case that the objectives of this division’s managers diverge from those of the new 
owners.  These (and likely many other) costs outweigh the benefits of getting rid of the hold-up 
problem. 
 
Why Have Natural Gas Contracts Traditionally Been Long-Term? 
The length of natural gas contracts has generally been between 15 and 25 years (Neuhoff and von 
Hirschhausen, 2005).  From an agency perspective, the duration of a contract is positively related with 
its level of risk –the greater the risk the longer the contract.  There is a large amount of risk taken by 
both buyers and sellers in the natural gas industry.  This is related to the size of investments, but also 
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uncertainty over the future price and demand for natural gas.  Using long-term contracts alleviates some 
of this risk by providing an insurance device guaranteeing some minimal level of returns. 
The major factor driving contract duration in the transaction cost approach is the size of relationship-
specific investments.  These investments lead to the hold-up problem, which can be overcome through 
the use of a longer-term contract.  As the size of these investments falls, this theory predicts that the 
duration of contracts should do so as well.4 
The level of uncertainty and regulation also play a part in determining optimal contract duration in the 
transaction cost approach.  Because contracts are always incomplete (they cannot contain every 
possible contingency), greater uncertainty leads to larger transactions costs.  These are the specific costs 
of monitoring a contract, or attempting to renegotiate due to some unforeseen event, or trying to 
mitigate opportunistic behavior on the part of either the buyer or seller more generally.   Thus higher 
uncertainty will tend to lead to shorter-term contracts according to the transactions cost theory. 5  
This is also true of industries which are highly regulated.  Poorly designed regulations misalign the 
incentives of buyers and sellers to such an extent that submitting to a contract becomes increasingly 
risky.  The misalignment of incentives raises the chances of either the buyer or seller trying to engage in 
opportunistic behavior.  This raises transactions costs, both because it requires additional monitoring 
and because such contingencies must be written into contracts, which works to reduce contract 
duration.6   
 
Why Have Natural Gas Contracts Traditionally Been Take-or-Pay? 
Take-or-pay contracts link buyers and sellers into a bilateral monopoly for a specified period.  Purchasers 
are required to pay for a pre-specified minimum quantity of gas, whether or not they take the gas, and 
producers are required to deliver this quantity.7  The basic idea is that the buyer bears the volume risk 
and the seller the price risk (Creti and Villeneuve, 2005).  
Agency theory does not provide any guidance regarding the structure and provision of contracts.  
Transaction cost economists have taken two different views on the emergence of take-or-pay provisions 
in natural gas contracts.  Both stem from the fact that all contracts are to some extent incomplete, and 
this incompleteness creates the possibility of opportunistic behavior on the part of either the buyer or 
seller. 
                                                          
4 Several studies have found evidence that contract duration increases with relationship-specific investments.  The 
classic result is due to Joskow (1987), who shows that the duration of contracts in the U.S. coal industry were 
positively related to the size of relationship-specific investments.  Crocker and Masten (1988) found this to be true 
in the U.S. natural gas industry, while Neumann and von Hirschhausen (2006) show this result holds in the global 
natural gas industry more generally, but particularly in European natural gas contracts. 
5 Crocker and Masten (1988) find that greater uncertainty after the 1973 Arab oil embargo led to shorter contracts 
in the U.S. natural gas industry.   
6 Crocker and Masten (1988) find that price regulation lead to shorter contracts in the U.S. natural gas industry. 
7 The prices in such contracts may also be indexed to some marker, for example crude oil. 
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One view is that take-or-pay provisions are risk-sharing instruments to overcome the hold-up problem.8  
The take-or-pay provision is a way to put price risk on the seller and quantity risk on the buyer.  An 
alternative theory is that take-or-pay provisions have emerged because they minimize transactions costs 
associated with contract verification.  This is because such contracts increase the flexibility of a long-
term contract (which usually adds complexity and costs) while making it easy to implement (which can 
reduce complexity and costs).9 
 
Why are Natural Gas Contracts Linked to Other Prices? 
Even when natural gas contracts are take-or-pay, the price stipulated in the contract is often linked to 
competing fuel or crude oil prices (EIA, 2003).  If the take-or-pay provision in the contract is viewed as a 
risk-sharing instrument, this price indexation may be a way to transfer risk.  This is the case if the price 
risk of the seller exceeds the quantity risk of the buyer.  The price indexation puts some of the price risk 
on the buyer as well. 
If the take-or-pay provision is viewed as a way to minimize transactions costs, then price indexation may 
reduce total costs.  This is true if the additional costs of price indexing are lower than the monitoring 
costs a buyer faces without indexation.  A final reason that natural gas contracts may be linked to other 
prices is due to market power.  The provision can be a means for the seller to use some of their market 
power to extract additional revenue from the buyer. 
 
What Might Change Indexation to Henry Hub? 
Given existing differentials in natural gas prices across regions, it is possible that contracts could be 
indexed to Henry Hub prices instead of competing fuel or crude oil prices.  If the take-or-pay provision in 
the contract is viewed as a risk-sharing instrument, this could occur because the distribution of risk has 
changed.  The buyer may be taking on more risk than the seller, given lower natural gas prices in other 
markets, and indexing to these other prices may distribute the risk more evenly. 
If the take-or-pay provision is viewed as a way to minimize transactions costs, then changing price 
indexation may reduce total costs.  In this case, the additional costs of changing the price index for the 
seller are lower than the monitoring costs they face without indexation.  A final reason that the price 
index in natural gas contracts may be changed is that the market power of sellers has fallen.  This might 
occur because of growth in the global LNG market or due to changes in regulations in consuming 
countries. 
 
                                                          
8 This is the approach behind the model in Hubbard and Weiner (1986). 
9 This approach is put forth in Masten and Crocker (1985). 
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Can the Global Natural Gas Industry Be Characterized as an Oligopoly? 
There is no mention of market power or collusive behavior in the agency or transaction cost theories 
discussed to this point.  Contracts are an efficient response of buyers and seller to their environment.  
However, contracts between firms can exist for anticompetitive reasons as well.  Contracts can be used 
to deny competitors’ access to either suppliers or buyers, forestall market entry, or diminish 
competition in the long run (Hauteclocque and Glachant, 2009).  Given the varying motives for firms to 
use long-term contracts, distinguishing the motives of buyers or sellers can be difficult.10 
The theoretical literature on market power and long-term contracts gives inconclusive results, and has 
focused primarily on the producer.11 One possibility is that long-term contracts reduce the ability of 
large sellers to use their market power.  Because the use of such power would only be profitable on the 
un-contracted portion of their supplies, long-term contracts lead to greater production then would have 
occurred in their absence.  However, sellers can exert market power in stipulating a higher price then 
would prevail in competitive conditions into the contract itself (Neuhoff and von Hirschhausen, 2005).  
The different results depend on whether the producer chooses quantity produced or price.  
Models that consider the sustainability of collusion also give mixed results.  Some theoretical models 
show that long-term contracts make markets more competitive because additional output is produced 
then would otherwise be the case.  Other models show that long-term contracts help to sustain 
collusion by buyers and sellers (Neuhoff and von Hirschhausen, 2005).  The different results depend on 
whether long-term contracts are repeatedly negotiated and followed by a spot market, or if these 
contracts can only be negotiated in one period and are then followed by repeated interactions on spot 
markets. 
There seems to be no theoretical analysis regarding the strategic motives of national companies and 
market power in the natural gas industry.12 
 
What are the Key Theoretical Factors in the Evolution of the Natural Gas Market? 
1. The size of relationship-specific investments 
According to the transaction cost theory, relationship-specific investments are a key factor in the 
existence and duration of long-term contracts.  As the size of these investments falls, the theory predicts 
                                                          
10 Hubbard and Weiner (1991) evaluate the importance of market power in long-term U.S. natural gas contracting 
as opposed to efficient contracting in response to market structure.  They find some evidence that a small number 
of buyers exert market power vis-à-vis a larger number of natural gas sellers (monopsony) in setting initial contract 
prices. 
11 These are almost exclusively game-theoretic models.  Shapiro (1989) provides a comprehensive survey of this 
literature. 
12 Creti and Villeneuve (2005) have a discussion of this topic relevant to the European natural gas market. 
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that contract duration will do so as well.13  The size of relationship-specific investments can fall due to 
industry maturity or the emergence of a liquid spot market.   
Industry maturity decreases the size of relationship-specific investments because many of the necessary 
facilities for the sale and distribution of natural gas have already been built.  This reduces the costs of 
switching trading partners.  The emergence of a liquid spot market reduces the size of relationship-
specific investments because it can reduce the transactions costs associated with bargaining when there 
are small numbers of buyers or sellers (or both). 
In addition to shortening the duration of long-term contracts, a reduced size of relationship-specific 
investments should increase the size of the natural gas market in terms of the number of buyers and 
sellers.  Because start-up costs are lower, additional buyers can enter and use the spot market.  This 
might include wholesalers or traders.  In the short-term this may not have an impact on the number of 
producers, but LNG market maturation may provide additional producers for the spot market as well.  
 
2. The number of buyers and sellers 
Both agency theory and transaction cost theory predict that additional buyers and sellers will work to 
reduce the length of contracts.  From an agency perspective, additional buyers or sellers reduce the risk 
of investing and not being able to find a buyer or seller in the future.  These additional buyers and sellers 
also reduce the transactions costs of negotiating contracts, which will reduce their duration as well.  
Standard microeconomic theory predicts that such additions of buyers and sellers also work to make the 
natural gas market more competitive. 
It seems that regulation plays a big role in the number of buyers and sellers in the natural gas market, 
while the LNG market can potentially play a large role in influencing the number of sellers in the market. 
 
3. Regulation 
Any type of regulation which distorts the incentives of buyers of sellers will shorten the duration of 
contracts in the natural gas industry according to transaction cost theory.  From an agency perspective 
this increased risk will lead to longer contracts.  The impact of poorly-structured regulations on contract 
duration is uncertain from a theoretical perspective. 
Well-structured regulations, however, are instrumental in avoiding situations where market power can 
be exerted.  This may occur in the context of pipelines, but also in terms of the development and 
functioning of liquid spot markets. 
 
                                                          
13 As was mentioned above Crocker and Masten (1988) and Neumann and von Hirschhausen (2006) find evidence 
for this in the U.S. and global natural gas industries. 
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4. Strategic national behavior 
There is little theory to understand how strategic national behavior will impact the global natural gas 
market.  But one can expect that the structure of contracts, size of relationship-specific investments, 
numbers of buyers and sellers, development of spot markets, and expansion of LNG trade will all be 
influenced by national objectives. 
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